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Abstract
One’s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious
processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person’s actions unconsciously even in
conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a
non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant’s own name was
among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked
participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli,
including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on ‘‘breakthrough’’ phenomena of personally relevant
stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and
process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.
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Introduction
The own name is among the first concepts that a human being
encounters. It is experienced countless times throughout the entire
lifespan and it is one of the most resilient entries in memory. The
sound of one’s spoken name and the appearance of its written
equivalent therefore constitute a unique part of our conscious
experience. Accordingly, there is good evidence that the own
name is processed in a privileged manner. Most notably, the own
name has the power to reach awareness in conditions in which
most other stimuli remain unnoticed: the well-known ‘‘break-
through’’ phenomenon [1].
Whereas privileged access to consciousness is one peculiarity of
the own name, little is known about such peculiarities in situations
in which the own name does not reach awareness. In other words,
it is unknown, whether the own name is also unique for
unconscious processing. The present study tests the hypothesis
that the own name is processed in a privileged manner despite
remaining unaware. Support for this hypothesis comes from recent
studies on patients with disorders of consciousness such as patients
in the vegetative state or the minimally conscious state [2–3].
These patients were confronted with their own names as oddballs
among other auditory stimuli, and the own name elicited a
pronounced mismatch negativity in the EEG signal (see also [4–
5]). In fact, a distinctive electrophysiological response to the
patient’s own name was observed at least in a subset of the
patients, and the presence of this response predicted subsequent
recovery. Thus, the own name seems to be processed even with
diminished consciousness – indicating that it might have a special
role for entirely unconscious processing.
In the current study we examined under more controlled
conditions whether the own name plays a unique role for
unconscious processing in healthy individuals. To this end, we
employed the subliminal priming paradigm, a well-established
method to explore the impact of unconsciously presented stimuli
[6–8]. In this paradigm, participants respond to a target which is
preceded by a subliminal prime stimulus. The prime occurs very
briefly and it is masked to prevent it from entering conscious
awareness. Yet, even though the prime is rendered invisible, it
nevertheless influences the response to the following target because
the prime already (pre)activates the associated response. Conse-
quently, responding is faster if prime and target call for the same
response as compared to different responses, indicating uncon-
scious prime processing.
Subliminal stimuli are, however, not processed inevitably. More
precisely, whereas primes that are also presented as targets
normally give rise to strong and robust priming effects across
various conditions [9], novel primes that are exclusively presented as
primes throughout the experiment are only effective under certain
conditions (for recent reviews see [10–12]).
One condition that renders such novel primes effective is when
the prime stimuli are expected. Manipulating participants’
expectations about potentially occurring stimuli is possible by
using either small or large target sets, e.g., by employing either 4 or
40 different stimuli as targets for two to-be-discriminated
categories [13–14]. With large target sets, novel primes typically
elicit significant priming effects whereas with small target sets, they
do not (cf. also [9,15–17]). With large target sets, participants likely
expect many different exemplars from the same semantic category
as the experienced targets. In contrast, small target sets give rise to
circumscribed expectations about the specific target stimuli, e.g.,
their specific perceptual appearance [14,16]. Consequently, a
novel prime will be expected in the former context but not in the
latter context and only primes that are expected in the current
context tend to elicit unconscious priming effects (for similar
results, see [18–20]).
The present experiment employs such a small target set to
explore whether the own name as an exceptionally important
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concept is also subject to this general restriction or whether the
own name can be processed unconsciously even in the absence of
explicit expectations. The latter hypothesis is in line with recent
studies showing neurophysiological responses to personal signifi-
cance as early as 40 ms after stimulus onset [21], i.e., on a
timescale that might be suitable to influence unconscious
processing [22–23]. To test this hypothesis, our participants
decided as fast as possible whether a target stimulus was a name or
a non-word (see Figure 1A). Targets were two female surnames,
two male surnames, and four meaningless letter strings. The
preceding subliminal prime was either a potential target stimulus
that participants practised during the experiment or a stimulus
that never appeared as target. Unbeknown to the participants,
their own name was among these novel primes as well as the name
of another, yoked participant (other name).
Crucially, we used a rather small target set of only four target
names and letter strings, i.e., we deliberately set up conditions that
render typical novel primes ineffective, even when these primes are
in close semantic relation to the following target [13]. Accordingly,
we expected the other name not to facilitate responses to name
targets. The own name, by contrast, might still be processed
unconsciously which would result in a priming effect for the own
name even though other unexpected primes are rendered
ineffective.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed participants (12 males; mean age:
22.9 years) were tested in individual sessions and were assigned to
yoked pairs of one male and one female participant each. The
yoking procedure ensured that both participants of each pair
encountered exactly the same stimuli throughout the experiment
even though the stimuli differed in personal significance (i.e., the
own name stimulus of participant 1 would be the other name
stimulus for participant 2, and vice versa). Consequently, a
differential impact of own and other name could not be due to
genuinely different perceptual relations of these novel primes to
Figure 1. Design and results of the experiment. (A) Participants classified a target as name or non-word; the target was always preceded by a
masked unconscious prime stimulus. Unbeknown to the participants, among these primes were their own name and the name of another, yoked
participant. (B) Participants responded significantly faster when prime and target called for the same response than for opposite responses, revealing
typical priming effects. Error-bars indicate 95% within-subjects confidence intervals, computed separately for each target type. (C) A more detailed
analysis of name targets revealed that the own name facilitated responding similar to target primes whereas the other name did not. Error-bars
indicate 95% within-subjects confidence intervals for the difference between own and other name primes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032402.g001
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the target stimuli. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive concerning the hypothesis of the
present study. Oral consent was acquired from each participant
prior to the experimental session and participants were debriefed
regarding the yoking procedure at the end of the session. Because
this was a non-clinical study without any harming procedure,
formal ethical approval was not sought. The data were analyzed
anonymously and we can ensure that participants’ identities are
protected.
Design and Procedure
Participants decided as fast as possible whether a letter string on
the computer screen was a name or a non-word by pressing a left
or a right response key (viewing distance: ca. 60 cm; monitor
frequency: 100 Hz; all stimuli appeared in 36 pt Courier New
font). Target stimuli were four German names (‘‘RAINER’’,
‘‘RENATE’’, ‘‘LISA’’, ‘‘BERT’’) and four non-words (‘‘ARSBNR’’,
‘‘SRBRAR’’, ‘‘IEBR’’, ‘‘AIST’’) and the target-key mapping was
counterbalanced across participants. The target was preceded by a
masked prime stimulus that was either among the potential target
stimuli, one of two additional non-words (‘‘Neti’’, ‘‘Irtaes’’), or,
crucially, the participant’s own name or the name of his or her
yoked partner. Targets always appeared in capital letters while
primes were spelled naturally with only the first letter capitalized.
The prime was embedded into pre- and post-mask, both of which
consisted of a rapid succession of 8 hash signs (‘‘########’’)
and the same number of percent signs (‘‘%%%%%%%%’’).
More precisely, each trial began with the pre-mask (30 ms hash
signs and 40 ms percent signs) followed by prime (30 ms) and post-
mask (20 ms hash signs and 30 ms percent signs). Then, the target
appeared for 200 ms. Finally, the screen was blanked while the
program waited up to 2000 ms for a response. Errors and response
omissions triggered a 1000 ms error message (German words
‘‘Fehler!’’ for errors, ‘‘Bitte schneller!’’ for omissions) whereas the
screen remained blank for the same period after correct responses.
The next trial started after an inter-trial-interval of 1000 ms.
Participants worked through 5 blocks of 128 trials each (8 target
primes68 targets+4 novel primes68 targets62). Afterwards,
participants were debriefed and completed an additional signal
detection task to test for prime visibility. The signal detection task
was similar to the main experiment but participants were asked to
make unspeeded responses to the prime instead of the target. This
task comprised a single block of 128 trials. The results of the signal
detection task confirmed that the primes and especially the own
name were indeed unconscious; d’ =20.04, t(23) =21.28,
p= .214 for all stimuli; d’ = 0.03, t(23) = 0.41, p= .682 for the
own name. These results suggest that the present setup effectively
prevented a breakthrough of the own name and allows us to
investigate how the own name is processed unconsciously.
Results
Response times were analyzed in two separate steps. First, we
ran a 262 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of prime
type (name vs. non-word) and target type (name vs. non-word) on
the entire data set to validate the employed priming paradigm.
Then, we analyzed the priming effect for name targets more
thoroughly by systematically comparing the different prime types.
For all reaction time (RT) analyses, we excluded error trials (7.3%)
and outliers deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from the
mean of the design cell (calculated separately for each participant;
,2.2% for all analyses).
Figure 1B shows that responses were facilitated when prime and
target called for the same response than for opposite responses,
revealing typical congruency effects. That is, participants respond-
ed faster when prime and target were both names or both non-
words as compared to the reverse combinations, F(1, 23) = 28.35,
p,.001, gp
2 = .55. Additionally, responses were faster for name
targets than for non-word targets, F(1, 23) = 12.89, p= .002,
gp
2 = .36, whereas the main effect of prime type did not approach
significance (F,1).
A similar analysis of the error data confirmed that the crucial
interaction in the RT data did not result from a speed-accuracy
trade-off. In fact, the interaction was also significant for error
percentages, F(1, 23) = 14.18, p= .001, gp
2 = 0.38. Participants
committed fewer errors when a name target was preceded by a
name prime (5.9%) than by a non-word prime (8.3%). Conversely,
non-word targets gave rise to more errors when preceded by name
primes (8.0%) as compared to non-word primes (6.8%). The main
effects of target type (F,1) and prime type were not significant,
F(1, 23) = 2.30, p= .143, gp
2 = 0.09.
Based on these effects, we further analyzed the differential
contributions of different primes to the congruency effect for name
targets. Crucially, the own name facilitated responding to a name
target to the same extent as a name that participants practiced as
visible target dozens of times, t(23) = 1.36, p= .187 (Figure 1C). To
the contrary, the other name had the same effect as presenting a
non-word prime, t(23) = 0.14, p= .887, a typical observation for
unexpected stimuli when the number of different targets is as small
as in the present study [14,19]. Consequently, participants
responded faster when the own name preceded a target name as
compared to the other name, t(23) = 2.68, p= .013. Thus, the own
name primes a name target, whereas another unexpected name
does not. To corroborate this conclusion, we further dissected the
congruent name target primes into identical (e.g. ‘‘Lisa’’.
‘‘LISA’’) and non-identical (e.g. ‘‘Lisa’’.‘‘BERT’’) target primes.
In line with previous studies (e.g., [7,24]), identical target primes
had a tremendous effect and gave rise to the fastest responses
(540 ms), clearly exceeding the effect of non-identical target
primes (556 ms), t(23) = 4.85, p,.001, as well as the effect of the
own name (558 ms), t(23) = 3.71, p= .001. This additional analysis,
however, also showed a remarkably similar effect of the own name
and non-identical target primes, t(23) = 0.41, p= .683.
As for the RT data, the differential analysis of error percentages
(for name targets) also yielded a slight advantage of identical target
primes (3.8%) as compared to the other three prime types
combined, t(23) = 2.81, p= .010. The error percentages for non-
identical target primes (5.8%), the own name (7.2%), and the other
name (6.3%), however, did not differ at all, p..134 for each
pairwise comparison. As for the first step of the analysis, these
results effectively rule out a speed-accuracy trade-off and allow for
a straightforward interpretation of the RT data. In addition, it
should be noted that we deliberately restricted this differential
analysis to name targets because the identification of non-words is
typically assumed to rely on qualitatively different processes than
the identification of words (see [24], for an extended discussion in
the context of the repetition priming paradigm). Consequently, the
impact of own and other name did not differ with regard to non-
word targets, t(23) = 0.90, p= .379, and both gave rise to reliably
faster reactions than potential target names did (ps,.002).
Discussion
The present study set out to investigate whether one of the most
important concepts for any individual – the own name – is
preferentially processed unconsciously. To this end, we employed
the subliminal priming paradigm and presented the participant’s
own name as an unexpected prime stimulus before name and non-
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word targets. The name of another, yoked participant served as a
control stimulus. Crucially, we used a small target set, a condition
that normally renders such novel primes ineffective [13]. This was
indeed the case for the other name which did not facilitate
responses to subsequent target names. The own name, however,
showed such a priming effect, indicating that it was processed
unconsciously. Thus, unconscious processes do not seem to
discriminate mandatorily between a non-word and a novel name
whereas the own name is readily processed even without reaching
conscious awareness.
This pattern of results departs from classic psychological
findings on the astonishing potential of the own name to capture
attention and its preferential access to consciousness (the well-
known ‘‘breakthrough’’ phenomenon; [1,25–30]). Such a break-
through would have been evident in an increased visibility of the
own masked name. The own name, however, was just as
undetectable as any other stimulus what is evident from the
present signal detection results. Thus, we demonstrate that the
own name is processed preferentially, even if its neural
representation is too weak to reach consciousness eventually [31].
We conjecture that the own name belongs to a limited set of
personally relevant stimuli that are obligatorily processed up to a
semantic level of analysis even in the absence of conscious
awareness [21,32]. Support for this conclusion comes from recent
electrophysiological studies that showed marked responses to one’s
own name in conditions of reduced consciousness such as sleep
[33] and the minimally conscious state [2–4]. Such preferential
unconscious processing of the own name has intriguing implica-
tions for current theories of consciousness such as Global
Workspace Theory [31]. Modern computational versions of this
theory assume consciousness to arise from biased competition of
separate modular processes (e.g., [34]). The present results suggest
that specific stimuli such as the own name can be processed very
elaborately even if these processes are not in the current focus of
the cognitive workspace and do therefore not gain access to
consciousness.
But what exactly is the mechanism behind this preferential
unconscious processing? Whereas several factors, such as personal
significance [25,27], emotional valence [35], and attention [36,37]
were shown to influence the conscious identification of (personally
relevant) stimuli, it is not clear whether these factors influence
unconscious processing in a similar way. Consequently, the
preferential unconscious processing of these stimuli might rely
on factors such as personal significance or, importantly, the
enormous experience with this particular stimulus. Alternatively,
the own name might not be obligatorily processed semantically but
instead it might be more efficient than other names in attracting
attention in the absence of conscious awareness, which might also
foster its processing [38]. Disentangling these processes certainly
deserves further elaboration. In any case, the present results clearly
show that humans are not only eager to detect their own name as
readily as possible – but that unconscious processes can identify
the own name already beforehand and possibly even without
telling. In other words: Your unconscious knows your name.
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